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KarlA. Boedecker,FredW.Morgan,& LindaBernsWright

The
Evolution of First
Amendment
Protection for
Commercial
Speech
During the past 15 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has used Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission
(1980) to expand significantly the power of the government at all levels to regulate advertising and other promotional activities. As a result, first amendment protection for commercial speech has steadily diminished. In this article, Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Central Hudson are reviewed to provide an update of Cohen's (1978)
work. In addition, the current standard for identifying commercial speech is analyzed, and managerial recommendations are made to guide managers who are responsible for making promotional decisions in this increasingly restricted area.

T he U.S. Supreme Court's distinction between commercialand noncommercialspeech providesfor a fundamental restriction of free speech. Noncommercial
speech, embodied in the phrases "freedomof speech" and
"freedom of expression," is entitled to virtually full first
amendmentprotection;l hence, the speakeris grantedconsiderablelatitudein stating a position.
Commercial speech is generally considered to be communications that have the sale of a product or service as
their ultimate goal. Content regulation of commercial
speech is allowed to preventfalse, deceptive, or misleading
informationfrom being transmitted(R.A.V v. Cityof St. Paul
1992). In addition,the means of communications(e.g., billboards, storefrontsigns) can also be regulatedto serve the
interestsof local communities(cf. Hays CountyGuardianv.
Supple 1992; Messer v. City of Douglasville 1992).
Commercialspeech was originally affordedvirtuallyno
first amendment protection. The Supreme Court reversed
this position duringthe 1970s, grantinglimited protectionto
commercial speech. Since 1980, the Court has once again
alteredthe directionof first amendmentdecisions, resulting
in additionalbounds on both the content(subjectmatterand
the explicit and imputedmotives of the sender) and method
(medium, timing, and location) of commercialcommunications. Thus, marketing'spromotionalcomponentis increasingly subject to restrictions originating outside the betterknown administrative (e.g., Federal Trade Commission,
Food and Drug Administration,and Federal Communications Commission) and legislative domains.
l"Fightingwords" (i.e., language intendedto incite violence), libel, obscene speech, and pornographyare generally outside the scope of first
amendmentprotection.
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The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of
the applicationof first amendmentlaw to various forms of
commercial expression to develop promotional guidelines
for marketingmanagers.First, we review the evolving treatment of commercial speech under the First Amendment.In
doing so, we focus primarilyon changes that have occurred
since Cohen's (1978) work. The currentstandardused by
courts to identify commercial speech is then illustratedin
use. Finally, the impact of commercialspeech regulationon
promotionaldecisions is discussed.

The Chronology of First
Amendment Decisions
1942-1974: Establishing and Regulating
Commercial Speech
In Valentinev. Chrestensen(1942), the U.S. SupremeCourt
first declaredthat the Constitutionplaced no restraintsupon
governmentregulationof commercialadvertising(See Table
1). Until this time, the Courthad not distinguishedbetween
commercial and noncommercialcommunications and had
explicitly extendedfirst amendmentcoverage beyond newspapers and magazines to other media, including television,
radio, billboards,pamphlets, and leaflets (Lovell v. Griffin
1938).
Subsequentto Valentine,the Court struggled inconsistently with a numberof contentand methodissues relatedto
commercial speech. First amendmentprotection was provided to door-to-door distributionof religious pamphlets
(Martin v. Struthers 1943; Murdockv. Pennsylvania 1943)
and to political advertising (New York Times v. Sullivan
1964). Conversely, city regulations banning door-to-door
solicitationby salespeople were upheld in Breardv. Alexandria (1951), and the distributionof advertisingleaflets on
city streets was forbidden(Jamison v. Texas 1943). Lacking
first amendmentprotectionfor commercial speech, government regulatorspossessed broad powers to control promotional activities by the early 1970s.
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TABLE 1
Judicial Tests for Analyzing Commercial Expressions
CommercialSpeech Test

Source
Valentinev. Chrestensen (1942)
New YorkTimes v. Sullivan(1964)
Bigelow v. Virginia(1975)
VirginiaPharmacyv. Citizens'(1976)
CentralHudson v. PublicService (1980)

Bolger v. YoungsDrug(1983)
Posadas v. Tourism(1986)
SFAAv. USOC (1987)
Board of Trusteesv. Fox (1989)

1975-1979: Reestablishing
Commercial Speech

Is the expression made primarilyfor commercial gain-the "primarypurpose"
test? Ifyes, then speech is accorded less protection.
Does the expression deal withmattersthat are primarilyof publicratherthan private (e.g., financial)concern? Ifyes, then speech is protected.
Does the expression convey informationof potentialinterest to a diverse audience not just to potentialcustomers? Ifyes, then speech is protected.
Do potentialrecipientsof commercialinformationhave substantial"listenerinterests" served by the communications?Ifyes, then speech is protected?
Commercialspeech referredto as "expressionrelatedsolely to the economic interests of the speaker"and "speech proposinga commercialtransaction."Fourparttest developed for evaluatingcommercialspeech regulation:(1) Is the expression misleadingand does it deal with lawfulactivities? (2) Does the governmenthave substantialinterestin the regulation?(3) Does the regulationadvance the government'sposition?and (4) Is the regulationtoo extensive?
Do the variousaspects of the speech combineto makethe communicationscommercialspeech?
Is the commercialactivitybeing advertised one that could legally be banned? If
yes, speech associated withthe activitycould also be outlawed.
Is the regulationof commercialspeech no broaderthan necessary to advance
the government'sinterest?[Thisdoes not requirethe regulationto be the "least
restrictivemeans"possible.]
Is the regulationof commercialspeech reasonable in terms of the government's
asserted purpose? Again, this does not requirethe regulationto be the "least
restrictivemeans"possible.

Protection of

The rule that commercial speech had no first amendment
protectionbegan to erode when the Courtinvalidateda Virginia statutethat criminalizedthe sale or circulationof any
publication that encouraged procurement of an abortion
(Bigelow v. Virginia 1975). The Court stated that the government cannot restrict advertising where the commercial
activity itself is legal and furthernoted that the "... activity
advertised pertained to constitutional interests" (Bigelow
1975, pp. 821-822).
In an ensuing case, the Court struckdown anotherVirginia statute that had outlawed advertising of prescription
drug prices. The Court stated that, "If there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising..." (Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens' ConsumerCouncil 1976, p. 757).
The Court did not, however, prohibit all regulation of
commercialspeech. The governmentcould place reasonable
restrictionsupon the time, place, and mannerof speech2and
could also enforce regulationsthat dealt with false, deceptive, or misleading advertising.The Court pointed out that
commercial speech protectionmight not exist for proposed
illegal transactions.It also noted that a different standard
2The "time, place, and manner"standardis appliedin cases of fully protected speech. Governmentscan restrict when, where, and how speech is
delivered, provided that the regulation does not affect the content of the
speech. Such regulationsare describedas "contentneutral."

might apply for advertising in the electronic broadcast
media.
Groupswere permittedto openly promotetheir interests
(trade association position) or products (contraceptives)in
First National Bankof Boston v. Bellotti (1977) and Careyv.
Population Services International(1977), respectively.The
Court also loosened state restrictions upon advertising by
professionals, most notably attorneys (Bates v. State Bar
1977; In Re Primus 1978), although a lesser degree of protection was established.In a relatedcase, however,attorneys
were prohibitedfrom soliciting clients in person (Ohralikv.
Ohio State Bar Association 1978). Optometrists were allowed to advertise their names but not their trade names
(Friedmanv. Rogers 1979).
During this same time the Court revoked a city ordinance thatforbadethe posting of real estate for sale and sold
signs, discounting the argumentthat other forms of advertising were available within the community (LinmarkAssociates v. Townshipof Willingboro 1977). The Court noted
that advertisingalternativessuch as newspapersand listings
with real estate agents were more costly and did not reach
prospectsas readily as signs.
This period resultedin several victories for advocatesof
limited first amendmentprotectionfor commercial speech.
Institutionaladvertisingseemed to be acceptableas was the
rightto advertisein variousmedia of the advertiser'schoice.
The specific content,that is, the languageof advertisingwas
not seriously examined by the Court.The Courtdid reserve
the government's right to place reasonable restrictions on
promotional efforts (Virginia State Board of Pharmacy),
FirstAmdendmentProtection/ 39
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particularlyif buyers were seen to be at a clear disadvantage
relative to sellers (Ohralik;Friedman).
1980-1985: Increasing Regulation Once Again
Five years afterBigelow, a four-partanalysis for commercial
speech cases was craftedin CentralHudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission(1980). The New York
Public Service Commission had ordered the state electric
utilities not to promote the use of electricity because of a
concern that demand would exceed supply. In 1977, the
Commission continuedits ban but allowed institutionaland
informational advertising. The Court concluded that the
Commission had failed to show that a more limited speech
regulationwould be ineffective and thereforeoverturnedthe
advertisingban (CentralHudson 1980, p. 571).
As articulatedin this opinion, the Court in commercial
speech cases would proceed through the following steps
(Central Hudson 1980, p. 566): (1) Determine whether the
expression is protected by the First Amendment, that is,
does it involve lawful activity and not mislead the audience?
(2) Does the government have a substantialinterest to be
achieved by restrictingthe speech? (3) Does the regulation
directly advance the government'sinterest?(4) Is the regulation more extensive than necessary to achieve that
interest?
Central Hudson amountedto a significant move in the
direction of regulatingcommercial speech, including truthful statements.The fourth step of Central Hudson has become, as will be shown, the focal point of debates in later
cases. The Court'sclaim that this four-parttest had evolved
from previous commercial speech cases was not documented. Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, argued that
this test allowed the Commission to manipulate the economic choices of consumers by curbing their access to information(McGowan 1990, p. 373).
In Metromediav. San Diego (1981) the Court,using the
Central Hudson test, distinguishedbetween the advertising
medium and message. The city of San Diego had barredany
off-premises advertising, effectively eliminating billboard
advertising; however, the rule infringed upon the general
public's first amendmentrights to carryor post signs carrying religious or political messages. The ordinance might
have been allowed if it dealt only with commercialmessages
on billboards.Indeed, the MetromediaCourtfound that the
First Amendment permits an ordinance that allows on-site
advertising(storefrontsigns and billboards),althoughit forbids off-site advertising(billboards).
In In Re R.M.J.(1982) the U.S. SupremeCourtsupported a Missouri lawyer's contentionthata state rule undulyrestricted (beyond the limits established in Central Hudson)
his ability to communicate with clients and prospects. The
attorneyhad merely published an ad and mailed announcement cards describinghis area of specialization.
The Court invoked Central Hudson again in Bolger v.
YoungsDrug Products Corp. (1983). This dispute involved
a federal statute that prohibitedthe mailing of unsolicited
advertisements for contraceptives. Youngs's mailings included informationalpamphlets describing how the use of
condoms could help preventvariousdisorders.The last page

stated thatYoungs, a distributorof Trojan-brandprophylactics, had providedthe pamphletas a public service. Though
Youngs prevailed, the Court broadened the permissible
scope of governmentregulationof promotionalactivitiesby
categorizingYoungs'spamphletsas commercialspeech.
CentralHudson and its progeny representa redirection
in terms of deciding what degree of protection to accord
commercial statements. Central Hudson amplified the
Court's examination of commercial speech to include a
judgment about the importance of regulating the subject
matter or activity in question. The Central Hudson Court
therefore withdrew some of the protectionbestowed upon
commercialspeech duringthe previous five years.
1986-1992: Extending Regulation Even Further
The Courtgreatlyexpandedgovernmentalpowers to control
promotionalactivityin Posadas de Puerto RicoAssociates v.
TourismCompanyof Puerto Rico (1986). The PuertoRican
legislaturehad legalized casino gamblingbut prohibitedthe
casinos from promotingtheir facilities to PuertoRican citizens. The TourismCompany,establishedby the legislature,
administeredthe gaming industry.That agency prohibited
casino franchiseholders from using the word casino on any
items accessible to people living in PuertoRico. Posadas, a
casino holding company,was fined for violating these regulations and subsequentlychallenged them.
Reactingto Posadas'sobjection,the PuertoRico Superior Court rewrote the regulations to try to resolve the first
amendmentproblems. The revised standardsrelaxed some
of the regulatoryagency's restrictions,but nonetheless allowed use of the word casino only where the tradename of
the hotel was used. The standardsalso requiredpreviousapprovalof the TourismCompanyfor advertisingand publicity addressedto touristswithin PuertoRico.
The Court declared that advertisingof casino gambling
could be forestalledbecause casino gamblingitself could be
banned. So where the underlying commercial endeavor
could be outlawed, the governmentcan forbid promotional
activitiesregardingthe endeavor.Thus, Posadas substantially reduced first amendmentsupport for commercial communications by upholding government authority for both
previous restraintand censorshipof truthfuladvertisingfor
a legal service.
The regulatoryexpansion of Posadas continued in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee(1987) (SFAAv. USOC). The USOC had been
grantedexclusive use of the word Olympic by the Amateur
SportsAct of 1978. WithoutUSOC's permission,SFAA had
begun using the term in promotionalmaterialsto create interest in the proposedGay Olympic Games. The USOC obtained a permanentinjunction,preventingSFAA from using
the word Olympic in any of its activities,3 and SFAA
appealed.
In finding for the USOC, the Courtstatedthat the "possibility for confusion as to sponsorshipis obvious"(SFAAv.
3TheAmateurSportsAct (1978) provides the USOC with broadercontrol over the word Olympic than would be availablefor a trademarkunder
the LanhamAct (1988). The USOC can prohibitthe use of the word even
in situationswhere there is no evidence of consumer/viewerconfusion.
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USOC 1987, p. 2982). The SFAA had intended both commercial and noncommercialuse of the word, including the
sale of several items carryingthe Gay Olympic Games slogan. The SFAA argued that the games would promote
greaterunderstandingamong people of differentages, races,
and sexual preferences. Thus, by banning the use of the
word Olympic, the Courteffectively blocked a considerable
amountof noncommercialspeech as well.
Justice Brennanobjected strongly to the SFAAdecision.
He maintained that the Amateur Sports Act restricts commercial speech beyond that requiredto furthera substantial
government interest-an outcome incompatible with the
fourth step of the Central Hudson test.4 The SFAA essentially condones the arbitrarysuppression of nondeceptive
uses of the word Olympic. To protectthe USOC's rights, the
Court might have grantedUSOC a trademarkfor the word
Olympic and requiredusers of the word to include a conspicuous disclosure statement(Garrison1991).
The Courtnext reviewed a case involving an attorneysoliciting prospectsby letter (Shaperov. KentuckyBar Association 1988) in violation of a rule prohibitingdirect mail solicitation for pecuniarygain. The KentuckySupremeCourt
upheld this law, even though the letter was found not to be
false or misleading by any reviewing body.
The Court found for the attorney,stating that the First
Amendmentdoes not permita complete ban on some forms
of commercial speech simply because they are more effective than other methods. The Court also decided that eliminating such communications would be inconsistent with
Posadas,s although such a letter could result in isolated
abuses, that is, mislead some people. The Court concluded
that direct mail advertisingis dissimilarto personalsolicitation because the latterprovidesmany more opportunitiesfor
undue seller influence. Direct mail, because it leaves a tangible record, is also more open to public scrutinyand proper regulation by authoritiesthan is personal selling. Thus,
whereas the Court allowed direct mail selling, it introduced
reasoning that eventually could be used to regulateface-toface selling under the FirstAmendment.
The Court reaffirmedgovernmentpower to ban promotional activities in Board of Trusteesof the State University
of New Yorkv. Fox (1989). The trustees had issued regulations that prohibited certain commercial activities on any
university property.Fox, a studenthosting productdemonstration parties in dormitories, contested the regulations.
The trial court upheld the trustees'sregulations,which were
overturnedon appeal.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the appellate judgment and remandedthe case for considerationof whether
the regulationswere adequateunderthe fourth step of Central Hudson.The Courtopined, however,thatdemonstration
4Regardingthe impact on noncommercialspeech, he noted that USOC
has permittedthe word Olympic to be used in reference to young persons
(Junior Olympics and ExplorerOlympics) and handicappedpeople (Special Olympics), while disallowing its use in referenceto senior citizens and
bodybuilders(SFAAv. USOC 1987, p. 2999). He asserted that restrictions
such as these amount to arbitrarycontent regulation of speech, which is
completely at odds with first amendmentprohibitionof restrictionsthat are
not content neutral.
5Becausethe practiceof law cannotbe banned,attorneyadvertisingmust
thereforebe lawful.

partiesamountedto commercialspeech thatproposeda lawful transactionand was not misleading. The Court thereby
upheld the power of a governmentbody to prohibitthe nondeceptive selling of legal products in an individual's residence. Fox noticeably extended the reach of the fourthelement of the Central Hudson test from "no more extensive
than necessary"to the "reasonableness"of the regulationin
the context of its objectives. The Fox Courtexplicitly noted
that it will not apply a "least restrictive means possible"
analysis to commercialspeech.
Then, in Peel v. AttorneyRegistrationand Disciplinary
Commissionof Illinois (1990), the Courtnegatedan Illinois
rule prohibiting attorney claims of being a certified legal
specialist. The Court found Peel's letterheadto be truthful,
not misleading, and verifiable and therefore nondeceptive.
The Courtconceded that a state does have a right to prevent
deception that might arise out of communicationssuch as
Peel's, but this interestwas deemed insufficient to justify a
categoricalban.
1993: Refining the Central Hudson Standard
The SupremeCourtappliedthe CentralHudson standardin
three 1993 commercialspeech cases, probablycausing more
confusion thanclarification.In City of Cincinnativ. Discovery Network(1993) and Edenfieldv. Fane (1993), the Court
rejecteda city ordinanceprohibitingmagazine and handbill
news racks (while allowing newspaper racks) and overturneda Floridastatutepreventingaccountantsfrom soliciting clients in person and by phone, respectively.Although
they met the first two prongs of the Central Hudson, both
these rules failed the thirdprong,thatis, neitherstandarddirectly advanced either governmentalunit's asserted interests. Both governmentscould have achievedtheir interestin
other ways that did not unreasonablyrestrict commercial
speech.
Conversely,the Court upheld a federal law prohibiting
radio stations from broadcastinglottery ads in states where
lotteries are forbidden(US and FCC v. Edge Broadcasting
Co. 1993). A radio station in North Carolina(which has no
lottery), with 92% of its listeners living in Virginia (which
has a lottery), challenged the federal statute.The Court accepted the state's argumentwithout relying on any demonstrableevidence, contraryto Edenfield.
Takentogether,Edenfieldand City of Cincinnatirequire
the government to support its position more thoroughly
when banning certain forms of commercial speech. Edge
Broadcasting,however,relaxes the evidentiaryrequirements
for the state. Moreover,the Courthas yet to clarify the term
reasonable6when applied to a law regulating commercial
speech.
6Althoughthe Courtnow seems to requirethe state to show throughextrinsic evidence that a statuteis reasonable,it has yet to offer a useful definition of the word reasonable.See Mandel (1994) for a discussion of this
issue and a review of the 1993 SupremeCourtcommercialspeech cases.
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1994: Limited Developments
In Ibanez v. Florida (1994) the Courtdiscussed commercial
speech issues.7 Here, the Courtrejected a Florida Board of
Accountancyruling that sought to preventIbanez from displaying her Certified Financial Planner credential on her
business cards, stationery,and Yellow Pages listing next to
her CPA and JD designations. This decision is compatible
with earlier rulings allowing professionals to advertise and
recognizes the legitimacy of promotingprofessionalorganization membershipsother than state-sponsoredones.
Summary of Commercial Speech Cases
The U.S. Supreme Courtcontinues to refine the distinction
between speech proposing commercial transactions and
other varieties of speech. More types of communication(in
termsof topics) tend to be moving to the commercialspeech
category, thus furthereroding overall first amendmentprotection for commercial expression. As a result, marketers
face a two-tiered dilemma (identifying commercial speech
and applyingthe currentcommercialspeech standard)when
tryingto gauge the borderbetween allowable and impermissible communications.

WorkingWiththe Current
CommercialSpeech Standard
Marketerswho are developing communications programs
must thereforeaddresstwo fundamentalissues regardingthe
First Amendment.The initial concern is to develop a sense
of the Court's current operating definition of commercial
speech. The second issue relatesto the Court'sview of commercial speech content and methodof communicationin the
context of Posadas and ensuing opinions.
Identifying Commercial Speech
The most elementary issue in a commercial speech case is
whetherthe communicationis in fact commercialand therefore should receive a lesser degree of protection (Petty
1993). The commercial/noncommercialdistinctionhas been
criticized routinely since its inception (cf. Murdockv. Pennsylvania 1943; Thomasv. Collins 1945). The essential problem is definitional: Criteria for identifying commercial
speech are not precise and have improved very little since
Valentine.
Most product-specificcommunicationstypify so-called
pure commercial speech. Product-line,product-family,and
some forms of corporateimage advertisingwould also be
categorized as commercial speech. Thus, the majority of
promotionalefforts would seem to be properlyclassified as
commercial speech. Gradation problems arise, however,
when (1) the speakeris not a for-profitentity and/oris presumably neutralregardingthe subjectmatter,or (2) the content of the speech includes topics that traditionallyare both
commercial and noncommercial. Such speech is labeled
mixed and may be fully protected because of its noncom7CityofLadue v. Gilleo (1994) also includes some commentsaboutcommercial speech.

mercial aspects or treatedsubordinatelydue to its commercial component.
Not-for-profitor neutral speakers. Many organizations
that are legally organizedas nonprofitinstitutionscarry out
fund-raisingactivities with full first amendmentprotection,
except in cases of fraud.8The most obvious examples arereligious, political, and charitable groups.9 Consider billboardssponsoredby an organizationthatfeaturea renowned
evangelist. Suppose the message urges viewers to purchase
expensive religious icons so as to be viewed more favorably
by the deity worshipedby the evangelist. The religious natureof the source gives it first amendmentprotectiondespite
the fund-raisingnatureof the communications.
Another relevantexample for marketersrelates to dealing with consumer interest groups or consumer watchdogs.
These groups and individualsare generally allowed greater
leeway in statingtheir positions about productsthan are the
companies marketingthese items. The Court's premise is
that these sources of informationdo not standto gain financially from their comments; hence, their positions are presumed to be neutralor more plausible than profit-oriented
marketers.Thus, marketersencounter credibility problems
when trying to negate the opinions (noncommercialspeech)
of presumablyneutral sources, such as ConsumerReports
(Redish 1990, p. 49), with theirown commercialstatements.
Evaluatingprofitmotives will be increasinglydifficultto
assess as complex business structures,such as strategic alliances, emerge. For example, several competing firms may
establish a not-for-profitjoint venture to obtain research
economies of scale. The affiliated firms benefit if this researchventureproclaimsthatthe most advancedtechnology
in a given areajust happens to be that of the funding companies. The not-for-profitpartnershipis the source of the
statement, but for-profit companies have underwrittenthe
research. The Court is likely to view such statements as
commercialspeech, unless it is convinced that thejoint venture is remote enough from its sponsors,that is, no common
personnel,physically separatefacilities, and minimal sponsor control over the researchagenda.
Commercial/noncommercialtopics. Health-related information is widely available in the U.S.,10 although food
and drug marketershave long been battlingfederal agencies
for greaterfreedom to advertisethe health benefits of their
offerings (Calfee and Pappalardo1991). However, communications about the health-relatedimpact of products are
controversialrelativeto the FirstAmendment.For example,
Retin-A has recently been observed to lighten liver spots, a
8Commercialspeech thatis acceptableunderthe FirstAmendmentis not
protectedif it leads to statutoryviolations (cf. ES Developmentv. RWMEnterprises 1991).
9See, for example, Cantwell v. Connecticut(1940) and Gaudiya Vaishnava Society v. San Francisco (1991)-religion; Boos v. Barry (1988)politics; Schneider v. State (1939)-charity. For a discussion of these primary first amendmenttopics, see Caywood and Preston(1989) or Estlund
(1990).
lOThefederalgovernmentassembles health informationfor international
travelers(Wade 1992), and cable television networksprovide severalchannels that concentrateon health-relatedtopics (Husni 1991). At the same
time, food marketersclaim that consumers are demandingmore health-related information(Dowdell and Crispens 1991).
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TABLE 2
Issues of Concern in an Analysis of Commercial Expression
Concerns of the Court

Issue
Message sender
Message receiver

Rightto communicatewithtarget marketsor the general public

Message content

Information versus persuasion; product information versus corporate image information versus general

Right to receive information about products/choices; right to ignore information;right not to be "exposed

too aggressively"to information

Medium

social importance
information;
Intrusiveness;pervasiveness; alternativemedia (availabilityand cost effectiveness)

Govenltent's role
in piotecting:
Sender

Reasonable access to media

Receiver
Public

Balancingknowledgebetween sender and receiver;balancingpower between sender and receiver
Minimum, established standards; avoiding unwarranted intrusions; restricted, sensitive topics

finding reportedby the same researchteam at the University of Michigan that four years earlierdiscoveredthat RetinA smooths facial wrinkles (Waldholz 1992). This research
project was funded in part by Johnson & Johnson (J&J),
which manufacturesand marketsthe drugand arguablybenefits from these findings.
Given the same study and findings, Michigan would be
given greaterfreedom to state its position thanJ&J,because
the university'sresearchis not done for the purposeof eventually marketingprofitableproducts.If J&Jmailed resultsof
this research to health professionals, its communications
would come under Food & Drug Administrationexamination, which would be more restrictive than a first amendment review. A J&J-sponsoredpress conference, because it
involves disseminatinginformationto the public throughthe
news media, would be subject to greaterscrutinyunderfirst
amendmentguidelines. Full-page advertisementsby J&J in
magazines and newspapers,even if they described only the
benefits of Retin-A, would likely be deemed commercial
speech.ll Even if this is commercial speech, some analysts
argue that the public interest component deserves full first
amendmentprotection(Radner 1993).
Summaryof the identificationproblem.None of the standardsforwardedin New YorkTimes(1964), Bigelow (1975),
and Virginia Pharmacy (1976), the major commercial
speech cases preceding Central Hudson (1980) (see Table
1), truly clarifies the commercial speech conundrum.Thus,
the threshold decision of whether certain communications
amount to commercial speech can sometimes be a difficult
one for the Court.
11Advocacyadvertisingis being increasinglyscrutinizedby the FTC. On
balance, the FTC's approachand the recommendationsof commentators
(cf. Cutler and Muehling 1989, 1991; Middleton 1991) are very similar to
the type of analysis conductedin first amendmentchallenges.
The R.J. Reynolds "Of Cigarettesand Science" advertorialis anotherexample of complex, competing positions. The FTC alleged that the ad misrepresentedthe health risks relatedto smoking, and R.J. Reynolds consented to cease the ad (In Re R.J. Reynolds 1990).
Commentatorshave been particularlycritical of the NutritionLabeling
and EducationAct (1990), suggesting that it violates the FirstAmendment
(Blim 1994).

The Court initially influences the outcome of a dispute
by categorizing the controversialspeech as noncommercial
and therebyvirtuallyimpossible to silence. Firms attemptto
sway the Court in this direction by cloaking their commercial messages with controversialor noncommercialsubject
matter.However,the tendency seems to be to classify more
and more types of mixed speech as commercial speech,
which is thenjudged accordingto CentralHudson,Posadas,
and subsequentlitigation.
Applying the Current Standard
After determiningthatthe speech in questionis commercial,
the Court must examine the content and method of the
speech in the context of the conflicting rights and interests
involved (Collins and Skover 1993a, b; Kozinskiand Banner
1993; Smolla 1993). A listing of the primaryissues/interests
that must be consideredby the Courtis presentedin Table2,
along with a brief descriptionof each.
The Court obviously will have a difficult time ensuring
that all interests are maximized because of the inherent
trade-offsinvolved. The right of a marketerto targetadvertisements to certain market segments might interfere with
rights of those not wantingto see the ad or not wantingthird
partiesto view the ads (Nesgos 1988). Forexample, for a variety of reasons some people may be offended by ads for
contraceptives.Their inadvertentexposure to such ads is regarded as less importantthan the right of others to be informedaboutcontraceptivealternativesand the rightof contraceptivesellers to promotetheirproducts.Moreover,given
broad public concern for minimizing the spread of AIDS,
the recognized utility of contraceptive use has increased.
However, if the ads are offensive in their execution, for example, vivid photographyand colorful language, the Court
may decide to protect society at large from such materials.
Thus, the Court must balance the various rights in the
context of existing trends and societal values. If a cure for
AIDS is developed and is eventuallyaffordableto everyone,
the rights of those objecting to contraceptiveads may begin
to dominate again, resulting in restrictionson contraceptive
advertisements.At that point, such ads may be prohibited
from all broadcastmedia but might be permittedin an inforFirstAmdendmentProtection/ 43
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mational format in print media targetedprimarilyat adults.
The rights of the contraceptive seller would become secondary and would therefore be constrained but not
eliminated.
A recent appellatedecision involving the Adolph Coors
Co. also illustrates the problems of separatingintertwined
rights (Adolph Coors Company v. Bentsen 1993). Coors
sought permissionto disclose the alcoholic contentof two of
its productson labels and in advertisements.Regulationsof
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms,dating back
to 1935, forbid such disclosures. Coors convinced the trial
court to enjoin the enforcementof this regulation.The appellate court (10th Circuit)agreed,statingthatthe regulation
failed the thirdand fourthprongsof the CentralHudsontest.
Coors's right to advertise, the public's interest in disclosures, and the government'sasserted interest in preventing
alcohol strength wars among brewers are in conflict and
must be harmonized.
Other situations may encompass only the rights of the
parties directly involved in the dispute. For example, when
states attemptto establish behavioral standardsfor professionals, for example, optometrists, physicians, and attorneys, they risk first amendmentviolations. After Edenfield
(1993) accountantsare allowed to approachpotentialclients
in person or by telephone, but attorneysare not yet permitted to solicit this aggressively. The Court must determine
how to protect exposed citizens who need legal counsel but
who might be susceptible to persuasive legal arguments,
while at the same time safeguardingthe right of others (attorneys) to communicatewith prospectiveclients.
The rationale of Central Hudson, which was extended
considerablyin Posadas, will be used to decide issues such
as these. Assuming the commercial communications are
lawful and not misleading (Central Hudson, step #1), the
weight attached to governmentalinterest in regulating the
questionable communications must be judged (step #2).
Rarely will a regulationbe expungedat this stage. The logic
underlyingthe contested rule will almost always be reasonable in terms of face validity, and the governmentalbody's
articulatedreasons for enacting the statute will usually be
well intended. Step #3 will also typically result in an affirmative answer:Most regulationsadvance the government's
interests.In fact, the legislative process at all levels generally includes an analysis of the congruencebetween the government'sgoals and the functioningof the law.
Most important,the appropriatenessof the commercial
speech restrictionsis finally evaluatedby the Court.The test
is whetherthe restrictionsare reasonableor no more extensive than necessary not whetherthey are the least restrictive
means possible. Thus, the Courtmust review argumentsregarding alternativepromotionalformats and message content availableto the marketer.

Impactof CommercialSpeech
Regulations on Promotional
Decisions
At the presenttime, targetedpromotionalefforts aimed at informinginterestedand qualifiedprospectsandcustomersre-

ceive the maximumcommercialspeech protection.Communications of demonstrableclaims are generally also acceptable to the Court.This protectionis decreasedsomewhatfor
highly persuasive efforts, especially if the seller is clearly
more familiar with the product than buyers. Untargeted
mass communicationsthat attemptto do more than inform
and that cannot be avoided by uninterested persons are
closely scrutinizedby the Court.
Like marketers,the Court considers the impact of the
commercial speech and its medium of delivery in applying
Central Hudson. In reviewing statutes designed to control
promotionalalternatives,the Courthas most often been critical of absolute bans because they are overly broad, thus
failing the fourth step of Central Hudson; that is, statutes
must not only effectively prevent unwanted commercial
speech through media restrictions, but they must not impinge upon allowable noncommercialspeech.
Attempts to regulate media have very consistently focused on the particularadvantagesof those media from the
marketer'sperspective.The Courthas learned that a particular message is more effective when transmittedby one
medium as opposed to another.The promotionalactivities
most likely to be affected by commercialspeech regulations
are outdoor advertising,direct marketing,personal selling,
and television advertising.
Outdoor Advertising
Numerous statutes have been enacted to limit or eliminate
billboards and signs. Decisions dealing with these regulations often note that billboardsand signs are publicly intrusive: They cannot be ignored or avoided due to their physical presence. The Courthas issued enough opinions to date
that could be used to draftlegislation calling for the banishment of all commercial signs and billboards that are not
within a few hundredfeet of the establishmentbeing advertised.12Firms large enough to do business in multiplejurisdictions will face myriadregulationsdealing with billboard
advertising.Organizationsthat rely on outdoor advertising
should begin to develop alternative,targetedforms of communication, especially in jurisdictions that are taking the
lead in reducingvisual clutter.
For example, a Marylandfederal district court recently
upheld a City of Baltimoreban on billboard advertisingof
alcoholic beverages (Anheuser-Buschand Penn Advertising
of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
1994). The court accepted the city's reasoning that billboards lead to the consumptionof alcohol by minors without hearing any empiricalevidence. This decision has been
widely criticized (cf. Davis 1994) and will undoubtedlybe
appealed,but it illustratesthe acerbicview of billboardsheld
by many people.
Direct Marketing
Similarly, the private intrusivenessof direct marketinghas
made it a targetof regulationsaimed at diminishingmarket12Thepresidentof one firm that operates numerousbillboardsdeclared
thathe was alreadydiversifyinghis business in anticipationof the day when
outdoor advertising is banned or severely restricted (Shaw and Pearson
1994).
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ing efforts that are thoughtto be too aggressive or generally
bothersome.Few first amendmentchallenges to direct mail
statuteshave been raised to date; however, this area is likely to parallelthe progressobservedrelativeto billboardsand
signs.13 Once legislators and regulatorsdetermine how to
limit directmarketingefforts withoutinfringingon noncommercial speech, Central Hudson provides broad discretionary power for severely reducing the variety and effectiveness of directmarketing.Regulationsin this area will be
particularlycomplex for marketersto anticipatebecause of
the overlappinginterestsof severalfederal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and the U.S. Postal Service.
Regulationswill most likely be aimed at restrictingmass
mailings or randomlygeneratedtelephone contacts that are
not based on the identificationof high-potentialprospects.
To minimize the likelihood of regulationsthatqualify under
the FirstAmendment,organizationsthatemploy direct mail
must secure appropriate mailing lists. Mail campaigns
aimed at persons who meet exacting marketprofile criteria
are likely to provokethe least resistance,because such mailings will yield the fewest formal complaints.
A similar admonition is relevant regardingunsolicited
telephone selling. Because the phone lines that telemarketers use for commercial messages are paid for by consumers, their demands for restrictionsare likely to be supported, at least until technology such as call-blocking is
widely available(Cain 1994, p. 665).
Personal Selling
The activities of salespeople, althoughtargetedat qualified
prospects, have been affected by first amendmentrulings.
The cases relatedto the promotionalefforts of attorneyscan
be conceptuallyextendedto other salesperson-prospectsituations. To date, attorneysare generallypermittedto describe
theirexpertise, but they cannotpersonallyapproachindividuals who are plainly in need of legal assistance. The Court
has reasoned that attorneyspossess superiorknowledge regarding the imminent legal dilemma and therefore might
overstatethe problemto gain business. Moreover,such consumers may be involved in emotionally charged situations
that could interferewith their making sound decisions about
retaininglegal counsel The consumeris thus protectedfrom
being placed at a disadvantageby unscrupulousattorneys.
Other situations exist where the seller's knowledge exceeds thatof the prospectrelativeto the offering in question.
The potential for encroachmentthroughregulation is considerable, particularlybecause the Court is more likely to
allow regulationsin situationswhere the commercialspeech
cannot be easily monitored by others. Thus, salesperson
conduct is susceptible to regulation,because most salesperson-client interactionscannot be observed by thirdparties.
The currentemphasison ethical behaviorby salespeople
must be stressedby organizationsin all industriesso thatexternal regulationsare not imposed (Schneider and Johnson
13InMoser v. FCC (1993), a federal districtcourt in Oregon outlawed a
federal statutethat allowed businesses to solicit customers over the phone
only if they employed live operators(no computerdialing/messages). An
appeal will probablybe filed by the FCC.

1992), and the claims of salespeople should be factuallycorrect and deal with issues that can be substantiated.Claims
that are not verifiable, especially if they are common in industriesor marketswhere sellers are obviously more knowledgeable than buyers, could lead to localized attempts at
regulatingsalespersonspeech to protectcustomers.
Television Advertising
The pervasive impact of television advertisinghas resulted
in a numberof regulationsthat promptedfirst amendment
objections. Certainproducts (e.g., cigarettes, distilled spirits) are precludedfrom being advertisedon television. The
argumentshere center on protectingcertainvulnerablesegments, generally children, from repeatedexposure to product advertisementsif they are deemed to be incapableof assessing a product's utility. Future regulations of televised
advertising are likely to focus on certain product classes,
with furtheremphasis on restrictingads for additionalproducts duringcertaintime segments.14

Summary
After reestablishingprotectionof commercial speech under
the First Amendment during the late 1970s, the U.S.
SupremeCourt has once again decided to limit this protection. The Central Hudson (1980) decision provided a fourpart test that has been used to restrictboth the content and
methodof commercialcommunication.The Posadas (1986)
extension of Central Hudson supplies additionalreasoning
to limit commercialspeech even further.
Most first amendment commercial speech cases deal
with efforts to constraindecisions regardingthe type of advertising medium, with ad content occasionally being considered.At present, the Court is moving in the direction of
diminishing the rights of the seller-advertiser.A continuation of this trend will affect all aspects of the promotional
mix, leading Kozinski and Banner15(1990, p. 653) to the
following conclusion:
...thecommercial
notcostfree.It gives
speechdoctrine...is
a governmenta powerfulweaponto suppressor control
If youthink
speechby classifyingit asmerelycommercial.
carefullyenough,you can finda commercialaspectto almostanyfirstamendment
case.Today'sprotectedexpressionmaybecometomorrow's
commercialspeech.
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